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Abstract
There is no clear-cut evidence on how the adoption of the European
fiscal standards influences discretionary fiscal policies within the Member
States. This study investigates that phenomenon on the example of the
2004 enlargement. The results show that the effects of the adoption of EU
fiscal rules bring a statistically significant change towards more counter-
cyclical behavior. The results are robust for different model specifications,
including alternative time spans and correcting for the possible influence
of the financial crises and political forces. Interestingly, the year 2004
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1 Introduction
Fiscal arrangements belong to the most criticized aspects of the European
Union’s (EU) internal policy (Candelon et al., 2010). A widely cited rea-
son for that concerns the inability of the EU governments to run stabiliz-
ing fiscal policies having the Maastricht Treaty (MT) and the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) in the background (Wyplosz, 2006; Gali and Perotti, 2003;
Candelon et al., 2010). However, there has been no clear-cut evidence on how
the EU fiscal rules affect discretionary fiscal policies nor what effects they pose
on business cycles within the EU. Some studies prove a significant change in
fiscal behavior after the adoption of the MT or the SGP fiscal rules, whereas
other research shows the opposite.
This paper contributes to the topic by assessing the influence of the adoption
of the EU fiscal standards on discretionary fiscal behavior empirically, on the
example of the 2004 EU enlargement. Moreover, in order to determine whether
the EU entry was a core event which influenced fiscal policies among the New
Member States, the analysis compares the tendencies in the fiscal behavior
between them and the Old Member states.
The study is carried out on all the New Member States (NMS) that joined
the EU in 2004; Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Following the literature, different model
specifications are applied to correct for possible biases. The first one, is the
simplest one and similar to the approach taken by Gali and Perotti (2003). It
estimates the influence of the output gap on discretionary fiscal decisions using
the fixed effects panel technique and assuming the existence of a structural break
in 2004. To correct for the possible bias resulting from the financial crisis and
the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone, we carry out the robustness check
by adding a proxy variable, reflecting the situation in the loan market, and by
cutting the time span of the analysis in 2008. The fifth model combines the
last two specifications. The time span of the study has been limited by data
availability and quality and, therefore, covers years 2000-2012.
To further investigate this phenomenon, the study focuses on the comparison
of discretionary fiscal policies between the NMS and Old Member States (OMS).
The OMS comprise 15 Member States which were in the EU before 2004 (Gali
and Perotti, 2003), i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
Interestingly, a remarkable and significant switch towards counter-cyclical
fiscal behavior is observed for the NMS, especially in the most recent years,
with no similar effect on the OMS. Among all the models for the latter, the only
well-specified one suggests that the OMS were running acyclical fiscal policies
for the entire period, driven mostly by external factors rather than complying
with the EU fiscal rules.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brings forward
the recent results on the topic and discusses the influence of fiscal policies on a
business cycle. Section 3 investigates the changes in discretionary fiscal policies
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before and after the 2004 EU enlargement. Additionally, we carry out the
robustness check to assess the validity of the results. Section 4 summarizes and
discusses some concerns regarding the results.
2 Literature review and motivation
Thinking of fiscal policy and its influence on the business cycle, one should dis-
tinguish between the effects of automatic stabilizers and discretionary actions.
The former relates to the natural budget responses to the business cycle fluc-
tuations (Candelon et al., 2010). For example, the revenues from taxes should
increase during upswings so that the budget balance becomes larger. Likewise,
when there is a recession, the budget balance should decrease as a consequence
of, for instance, increased unemployment spending. In short, automatic stabi-
lizers work as a natural mechanism to accumulate capital during booms and
spend it during downswings. This all makes the business cycle less vulnerable
and aims to provide solid economic growth (Wyplosz, 2006).
However, fiscal authorities are able to stipulate the economy beyond the au-
tomatic stabilizers’ level. Such actions are called discretionary fiscal policy. Fol-
lowing Kydland and Prescott (1977), it may be driven by the time inconsistency
of economic decisions or could be a straightforward consequence of political mo-
tivation (Pendleton, 1938; Alesina et al., 2008). An example of a discretionary
action could be a change in the tax levels or a revision in government investment
policy, for example.
A common view supposes that once a budget is balanced, discretionary ac-
tions should be avoided and the reaction to business cycle fluctuations should be
left for automatic stabilizers only (European Comission, 2001; Beetsma, 2001;
Artis and Buti, 2000). Looking at the EU countries, the condition of a balanced
budgetary position has not been always satisfied, mostly because when the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union (EMU) was introduced, fiscal policy became the only
macroeconomic management instrument. Therefore, it is unlikely that Member
States would resign from it easily, violating the balanced budget plan (Wyplosz,
2006).
Excessive discretionary policy could have dramatic consequences for the
economy (Wyplosz, 2006). It can not only drive the amount of public debt
beyond the sustainable level but can also exacerbate the business cycle or/and
foster uncertainty in the markets. The current situation in Europe, with many
economies facing fiscal difficulties, reveals these problems. For about five years
now EU and especially Euro zone members have been impaired by the financial
and debt crisis. Enormous financial rescue programs had to be arranged in or-
der to support seriously debt-troubled economies, such as Greece for instance,
and to restore financial stabilization. This assistance is tied to requirements
to implement strict austerity measures (European Commission, 2013). By now
the Euro zone members Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal receive financial
support. Recently, also Cyprus applied for assistance.
In order to induce sound fiscal performance and to limit the excessive dis-
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cretionary actions within the EU, the MT implemented basic fiscal rules. They
refer to the upper deficit and debt ceilings which each country has to respect,
i.e. 3 percent deficit-to-GDP and 60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. Since their
introduction in 1992, they have been steadily modified in order to make them
more accurate. In 1997 they were extended by the SGP and in 2005 by the
decision of European Council entitled ’Improving the Operation of the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact’.1 As a result, the performance of the EU fiscal rules
has been improved, however, they still have some drawbacks (Buti et al., 2003;
Wyplosz, 2006).
The biggest critique of the EU fiscal arrangements comes from the fact that
they might limit the flexibility of national fiscal authorities too much, especially
during recessions (Gali and Perotti, 2003), but also during recently observed
financial crises. Consequently, governments would not be able to follow counter-
cyclical policies and impose balanced budgetary plans because they would be
absorbed by fighting external shocks instead or they would be facing internal
political pressure.
Scholars have tried to explain empirically whether those threats are jus-
tified. The results are, however, ambiguous. Two basic concepts arise from
the literature. The first one, proved by Buti et al. (1997); Gali and Perotti
(2003) and Wyplosz (2006), states that discretionary fiscal policies in the EMU
countries were pro-cyclical before 1992 and acyclical afterwards.2 The second
concept refers to studies of Von Hagen (2005) and Candelon et al. (2010) who
also confirm that before 1992 the discretionary fiscal policies in the EMU were
pro-cyclical, however, they remained pro-cyclical after the MT was signed. An
interesting conclusion from Candelon et al. (2010) is that the empirical results
are very susceptible to the time spans of the analysis. In fact, using similar
methodology to Gali and Perotti (2003) but expanding the data set by two
years only, Candelon et al. (2010) obtained the opposite results.
This study contributes to the discussion by expanding the scope of the anal-
ysis to the NMS and includes the most recent years. Additionally, our dataset
consists of quarterly data having more degrees of freedom and making the anal-
ysis more robust.
3 The 2004 enlargement
Fiscal policies in the NMS have been characterized by a strong heterogeneity
among countries with some running pro-cyclical and others running counter-
cyclical policies (Schneider and Zapal, 2005). However, none of the studies
treated the characteristics of fiscal policies in accordance with a structural break
in 2004 - a year when the NMS officially became a part of the EU and adopted
its fiscal standards. Moreover, previous research took a very narrow view on
the recent situation of fiscal policies in the NMS. In fact, none of the studies
1For a detailed analysis of the evolution of fiscal rules in the EU, see Wyplosz (2006).
2The term ’acyclical’ refers to Gali and Perotti (2003) and means that there was no signif-
icant impact of discretionary policy on the business cycle fluctuations.
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analyzes the NMS in isolation after 2006. Eventually, we may find an evidence
in favor of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies in the NMS until 2006 with barely
any insight on what happened afterwards.
To assess whether the NMS changed their fiscal behavior after adopting EU
fiscal target, this study uses the methodology proposed by Gali and Perotti
(2003) and extended by Candelon et al. (2010). The idea is to estimate the
influence of the economy output gap on discretionary policy, which is approxi-
mated by the structural (primary) budget balance. In other words, fiscal policy
is assessed from the perspective of a reference value that is not influenced by
the cyclical component. In this study, the reference value is the potential GDP.
The workhorse panel model specification may be written as:
di,t = β0 + β
BEU
d di,t−1 + β
AEU
d di,t−1
+ βBEUgap Ei,t−1[gap
BEU
i,t ] + β
AEU
gap Ei,t−1[gap
AEU
i,t ]
+ βBEUb bi,t−1 + β
AEU
b bi,t−1 +B
BEUΩBEUi,t +B
AEUΩAEUi,t + ui,t,
(1)
where di,t is a proxy for structural budget balance, Ei,t−1[gapi,t] reflects the
output gap expected at a previous period and bi,t is the debt level. Matrix Ω
consists of control variables, described in detail later, and B is a correspond-
ing vector of coefficients. Subscripts i and t refer to country and time dimen-
sions respectively. The error term consists of individual and time-specific effects
(ui,t = vi+ εi,t) . The model distinguishes between the influence of output gaps
on the discretionary policy before (βBEUgap ) and after (β
AEU
gap ) the structural break
in 2004. Also, the control variables are split before and after EU entry as well.
In fact, since we are endowed with quarterly data, we cut the sample in the last
quarter of 2004. To correct for the country size, all of the variables are taken
relative to GDP.
Taking the expectation of the output gap at a previous period makes a clear
sense. Any government decides on fiscal policy using the expected output gap
variations (Gali and Perotti, 2003). This study assumes rational expectations
(Et−1[gapt] = gapt) which is not far from reality taking into account that the
fiscal authorities should know the response functions. This assumption is in line
with the literature (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Candelon et al., 2010; Wyplosz, 2006;
Marinheiro, 2005).
Positive values of βBEUgap or β
AEU
gap indicate counter-cyclical discretionary pol-
icy in a given period. In fact, this suggests that a fiscal authority was increasing
structural budget balance during upswings which is exactly the definition of a
counter-cyclical fiscal behavior. The βd coefficient suggests that a fiscal author-
ity is concerned about previous period conditions and tries to include them in
the current fiscal policy. This makes a clear sense. If a government is worried
about the deficit levels from the past, it should increase today’s balance to sta-
bilize it. Additionally, more technically speaking βd > 0 indicates extrapolative
or a kind of trend-following while βd < 0 reveals mean reversive behavior. The
stationarity of the deficit time series is supported by |βd| < 1 (Roodman, 2006).
The specification of the model may lead to an endogeneity bias which arises
between structural deficit and output gap. To correct for that, the instrumen-
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tal variable (IV) technique is used with a standard fixed effects model.3 To
determine the proper instruments we follow closely the settings from Gali and
Perotti (2003) and Candelon et al. (2010) and use up to the second lag of the
output gap in the United States. Clearly, one would expect a high correlation
between the lagged US and current EU production as a result of high trade flows
and foreign direct investments. It is, however, doubtful to find a relationship
between it and the structural budget deficits across the EU, which should make
it a good instrument. Additionally, its validity is assessed statistically.
3.1 Data
For a first step, an illustration of the relevant variables is a good mean to get
an idea of the economic circumstances and public finances in the NMS and the
OMS. The data for the following eight figures comes from the European Central
Bank (2013) and the International Monetary Fund (2013).
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Figure 1: Primary balance ratio
NMS.
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Figure 2: Primary balance ratio
OMS.
The variables we take into consideration in our analysis refer to the cen-
tral public finance indicators as well as to instruments which governments may
influence. As a proxy for measuring discretionary fiscal policy, the dependent
variable in our setting, we chose the primary balance to GDP ratio (Gali and
Perotti, 2003). This is a parameter which the administration can directly influ-
ence through its budget, tax or spending (in general fiscal) policy. The data for
3(Candelon et al., 2010) applies the dynamic panel method to correct for the endogeneity
bias. Originally, the dynamic panel technique was designed for large-N and small-T samples,
meaning for settings with many individuals and limited number of periods. In our dataset,
however, we observe the opposite. Therefore, we favor the panel IV technique over the dynamic
panel methods.
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Figure 3: Output gap ratio NMS.
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Figure 4: Output gap ratio OMS.
the primary balance ratios is depicted in figures 1 for the NMS and 2 for the
OMS.
What concerns the primary balance ratios for the NMS, figure 1, certainly the
one-off effect in Hungary in the first quarter 2011 is a distinctive feature. This
irregular budgetary surplus was due to revenues from a shift of pension assets
(International Monetary Fund, 2012).4 Besides that, the primary balance ratios
mainly oscillate around zero. For the OMS, figure 2, generally a slight negative
tendency of the primary surplus ratios may be observed with the extreme values
of Ireland in 2010, due to stabilization of the banking sector. Soon afterwards,
in November 2010, Ireland applied for financial assistance with a volume of 85
billion Euros (EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility), 2013). Also for
Greece a severe deterioration of the primary balance ratio is depicted for the
crisis years, however, for both economies some improvement is visible for the
recent observations.
Regarding the explanatory variables, our central regressor is the output gap
ratio. It is constructed by calculating the difference between the observed GDP
value, denote it by Y , and the GDP trend, Y ∗, relative to the GDP trend:
(Y−Y ∗)/Y ∗. Obviously, positive values indicate economic booms while negative
values represent downswings. The data is depicted in figures 3 for the NMS and
4 for the OMS. The output gap ratios of the NMS, figure 3, generally show a
slight positive trend until about 2007, which, however then collapsed with the
financial and debt crisis. Extreme negative values can be observed in Latvia
and Estonia in 2009. Latvia also shows the highest output gap ratio in the
last quarter of 2006. Recently, some catching up tendency for most economies
4This outlier does not bring any qualitative change to the estimation results so as to the
final inference. Therefore, we decide to leave it in the dataset in order to make it more
methodology consistent.
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can be observed. For the OMS, figure 4, the general pattern is more volatile:
the output gap ratios mainly decrease towards the early 2000s, afterwards they
improve until about 2007 with especially large positive values for Finland and
Luxembourg. Certainly, the situation deteriorated with the outbreak of the
crisis. Nevertheless, the recent observations indicate a slow recovery and upward
trend in the output gap for many of the OMS.
Due to the recent developments with the financial and debt crisis aﬄicting
Europe, the plots of the debt to GDP ratios and the interest rate gap (compared
to Germany’s long run bond yield) have been chosen to visualize the situation
for the time span 2000-2011. Certainly, the public debt to GDP ratio is included
as an explanatory variable, since it is one of the reference indicators from the
MT which recently has become important as a result of the financial and debt
crisis. (For endogenity and likely correlation effects it is included in lagged
terms.)
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Figure 5: Debt ratio NMS.
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Figure 6: Debt ratio OMS.
Without any doubt, the evolution of the debt to GDP ratios in figures 5 and 6
has significantly been shaped by the crisis. The debt ratio level of some of the
OMS used to be higher than for the NMS, for instance in Belgium, Greece and
Italy the initial values in 2000 were above 100%. Moreover, within the group
of the NMS some countries also show a decline of their debt ratios after the
2004 enlargement (our reference year for the behavior change due to the EU
extension), such as Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia. Thus, while for the OMS the
distinctive feature here is an increase in public debt during the crisis, many of
the NMS’s debt ratios additionally tend to be shaped by the 2004 enlargement.
Further, in order to take into account possible crisis volatility the interest
rate spreads from figures 7 and 8 are included in our model. They are deter-
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mined by the difference between the individual long run government bond yield
compared to the reference value of the German log run bond yield. The de-
2000 2005 2010 2015
0
2
4
6
8
10
Time
In
te
re
st
 ra
te
 g
ap
,
 
in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
Cyprus
Czech
Estonia
Hungary
Lithuania
Latvia
Malta
Poland
Slovenia
Slovakia
Figure 7: Interest rate gap NMS.
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Figure 8: Interest rate gap OMS.
velopment of the spreads reveals a familiar pattern: figure. 7 shows an almost
u-shaped run for the NMS, which also displays the dynamics of the proceeding
of the European integration. Many of these interest rate gaps were decreasing
until about 2004 and then stayed low until about 2008. With the outbreak
of the crisis they began to rise again. For the OMS’s spread development in
figure. 8, again, the crisis years shape the characteristic run.
Moreover, to capture potential influence of political effects, a dummy vari-
able for parliamentary elections is added to the model for the years when the
election took place. Such a specification corrects for possible bias resulting from
irresponsible budgetary spending in the election years (De Haan et al., 2003).
Usually, empirical analyses are limited by data quality and availability, which
holds especially true for studies concerning NMS. Therefore, we used a com-
bined data set, mainly consisting of data from European Central Bank (2013)
and International Monetary Fund (2013). The election variable concerns par-
liamentary election dates and has been taken from International Foundation for
Electoral Systems (IFES) (2013). Regarding the frequency, we employed quar-
terly data in order to enhance the time span, here covering the years from 2000
(Q1) until 2011 (Q4). This yields 48 observations per country and a total size of
N = 480 for NMS and N = 720 for OMS. Obtaining a continuous and consistent
series required a thorough data set preparation. Seldom missing observations
had been extrapolated in order to make the panel balanced. Moreover, for cal-
culation of the GDP trend Y ∗, the real GDP series had been filtered with a
Hodrick-Prescott method in R 2.9.0. Finally, all variables had been seasonally
adjusted.
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3.2 Results
The regression outcomes for the NMS are presented in Table 1.5 For clarity
reasons, we present the results for all the model specifications. First, for the
full sample and standard regressors (lagged budget balance, output gap ratio
and lagged debt ratio - all before and after EU entry) see Model 1, presented in
the first column. Taking into account the current crisis, we followed a twofold
approach. On the one hand we cut the sample and consider only the time period
before the crisis (Q12001-Q42008), model type 2, second column. On the other
hand, we include the interest rate gap, model type 3, third column. Finally, as an
additional specification we also include an election dummy variable, capturing
the influence of politics, type 4 and 5, forth and fifths column respectively. The
reason for cutting the sample in the last quarter of 2008 is twofold: on the one
hand this allows to equalize the number of the degrees of freedom and on the
other hand it enables to observe the behavior before the crisis began.
The results show that the coefficients of interest βBEU and βAEU , which
correspond to the effect of the output gap ratio before and after EU enlargement
in 2004 on the primary balance ratio, are statistically significant after EU entry
only. Interestingly, all βAEU coefficients are positive indicating counter-cyclical
fiscal policy in NMS after joining the EU. This holds true for all model type
specifications. The results suggest also that the discretionary fiscal policies
before the 2004 entry were acyclical, in a sense that there was no statistically
significant influence from the output gap on the structural balance. This is
somehow confirming the results from Schneider and Zapal (2005) but on the
aggregate level, with some countries running pro-cyclical and the other having
counter-cyclical budgetary positions. These results might be interpreted in two
ways proving that either the heterogeneity in fiscal behavior decreased and the
fiscal change was relatively small, or the heterogeneity persisted with the 2004
effect being relatively larger. This is out of the scope of this paper to investigate
this in details and we leave this interesting topic for further consideration.
Concerning the other coefficients, only the lagged primary balance turns out
to be statistically significant for all of the model specifications. As expected
the coefficient is positive and lies on the unit circle, confirming the stationarity
(Roodman, 2006). In line with the comments from above concerning the βd
being smaller or larger than zero, the results suggest a trend-following behavior.
This reflects objections of the administration about previous periods conditions.
Further, the interest rate gap and election variable prove to affect the primary
balance significantly and negatively after 2004 entry. For the interest rate this
may display the influence of the current crisis. The higher the gap, i.e. the worse
the economic condition of the economy, the higher the deficit in this period. The
negative election effect indicates lower surpluses in times of elections (potentially
’election gifts’), also in line with theory (De Haan et al., 2003).
Interpreting our results for the NMS from an economic policy perspective
yields very interesting insights on the actual discretionary fiscal policies in a
given time span. The outcomes reveal a statistically significant change towards
5All the estimations have been implemented in STATA 12.
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the counter-cyclical fiscal behavior after 2004. The result is robust with respect
to almost all model specifications except for model 3, i.e. when correcting for
interest rate gap only. This might suggest that countries which were suffering
from the high interest rates (comparing to Germany) did not change their fiscal
behavior that much. In fact, one should expect that the EU fiscal rules would be
accepted mostly in countries which do not suffer from the economic turbulence
(Wyplosz, 2006). However, correcting for the crisis and political forces, the
change in 2004 becomes significant again, confirming previous reasoning.
Year 2004 brought a significant change to almost all of the regressors. One
may claim that this is a result of an increased number of degrees of freedom for
the after-2004-specification. However, even if we correct for the sample size, the
results remain similar. In fact, it seems that the EU entry did not only change
the discretionary fiscal behavior among the NMS but it also shaped the fiscal
responses against different financial and political forces.
One should pay attention to the possible over-identification problems, result-
ing from the choice of instruments. The number of lags in the instrument space
was chosen in order to yield a maximum Sargan test p-value. Nevertheless, they
might seem troubling for some of the readers. When considering the p-values
for the standard Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, one should keep
in mind the possible heteroscedasticity of the errors which could influence the
test performance (Roodman, 2006). In fact, the magnitude of the p-values is
similar to the one presented in Candelon et al. (2010) for the comparable model
specifications, being acceptable at the 5% significance level. Therefore, in order
to draw conclusions, one should pay attention to the holistic perspective of our
estimation results. The well specified model, i.e. model with the truncated
time span, confirms the main inference from the other models together with
satisfying the over-identification restrictions.
Interestingly, one may think of the reason why there are over-identification
problems with years after 2008. An explanation could lie in the increased het-
erogeneity in reactions to the financial crisis among the NMS. Clearly, different
NMS got different exposure to foreign risks and were differently affected by the
crisis. For instance countries like Lithuania, Estonia or Latvia suffered from a
huge economic losses immediately after the US crisis. At the same time, the
economic situation in Cyprus or Slovenia was mostly affected in the aftermath
of the sovereign debt crisis which spread across Europe two years later. Coun-
tries like Poland were pretty robust to the foreign shocks as a result of a strong
internal consumption and a relatively low degree of internalization of the capital
flows. Hungary, however, is a kind of a special case, as the situation may be
reckoned to be strongly politically influenced. Concerning Slovakia and Czech
Republic, the situation indicates to be relatively similar to Poland, while the
behavior of Malta resembles Cyprus.
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3.3 Comparison to the OMS
The results for the OMS are presented in Table 2. The model specifications
remain the same as in the previous section.
Since the results suffer from the over-identification bias, they should be taken
with caution and should be treated as a comparison for the NMS rather than
suiting to draw actual policy conclusions from. The only well specified model,
i.e. the model for the truncated time span, suggests, however, that there was no
statistically significant change in fiscal behavior for the OMS in year 2004. The
other model specifications confirm this. The outcomes may also suggest counter-
cyclical policy after 2004 but it seems to be very influenced by crisis effects. On
the one hand, without the crisis years (the truncated sample) the coefficient of
interest looses statistical significance and on the other hand including the crisis
years yields significant positive effects of the output gap and negative effects of
the debt ratio (unsuitable behavior).
The goal of this comparison is to check if there were any other factors in 2004
which could have led to a switch in the discretionary fiscal policies among the
member states. It seems that the 2004 effect could be clearly recognized for the
NMS only, with no clear-cut evidence for a change in the other member states.
Interestingly, one may get an impression that the fiscal policies in the OMS
are shaped by different factors than these in the NMS. The over-identification
problems and the counter-intuitive sign for the lagged debt variable are just
symptoms of that phenomenon. One may also observe no political influence on
the fiscal behavior, together with much higher R-squared coefficients.
In fact this might be the confirmation of previously mentioned literature,
which pointed out the problem of lack of incentives to run more counter-cyclical
fiscal policies and curb down the deficit and debt levels once in the EU (Wyplosz,
2006; Wyplosz, 2002). Our analysis confirms that the NMS were trying to satisfy
the MT and SGP regulations and they actually changed their fiscal behavior
entering the EU. It is difficult, however, to determine the fiscal stance of the
OMS. Certainly, they did not change their fiscal policies in 2004. Moreover, their
fiscal behavior was mostly driven by the crisis effects with barely any insight on
other indicators. All this might be viewed as a contribution towards the ongoing
discussion on the relevance and effectiveness of the EU fiscal standards.
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4 Summary
In line with the economic literature and recent considerations on the European
integration and adoption of the fiscal rules, this paper continues and contributes
to the discussion by addressing the aspect how fiscal rules affect discretionary
policy behavior of governments in the European Union. In times like these,
with the financial and debt crisis affecting especially Europe, such an analysis
certainly is of special relevance.
Our study includes 25 EU member economies, however, a special focus is set
on ten NMS, which joined the EU in 2004. Based on quarterly data covering
the years 2000 until 2011 and different specifications regarding the explanatory
variables, a panel regression with the IV technique has been implemented. In
order to study the influence of the adoption of fiscal rules on discretionary policy
the model estimates the relationship between the structural primary balance
ratio and the central regressor: the output gap ratio, which represents the
economic performance and situation.
The results indicate a statistically significant switch towards counter-cyclical
fiscal policy behavior of the NMS after their EU entry. The specification meth-
ods confirm previous findings of possible heterogeneity in fiscal behavior in our
sample (Schneider and Zapal, 2005). On average, however, NMS were running
stabilizing budgetary positions as of the year 2004.
For reasons of comparison the same investigation has been implemented for
the OMS. The results suggest that the fiscal behavior among the OMS was
driven by different factors from the ones among the NMS. It seems that once
in the EU, a member loses the incentives for prudent fiscal behavior. This
phenomenon has been recognized in previous studies and is currently a topic of
consideration of the European Commission, European Parliament and national
governments in the EU (Schaechter et al., 2012). We believe that this study
will contribute to the ongoing discussion, yielding a mechanism towards more
prudent fiscal performance once in the EU.
Certainly, these results should not be interpreted in isolation. The bud-
getary policies have been considered as an everlasting topic for discussion in
the European history and might be affected by other factors than we included
in our analysis. In order to get a comprehensive picture, one should consider
country-specific research, treating the fiscal performance of each NMS individ-
ually. Our outcomes reveal just a top of an ice berg in the fiscal performance in
the NMS after the EU entry.
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